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We consider a class of production-investment models in discrete time with
proportional transaction costs. For linear production functions, we study a nat-
ural extension of the no-arbitrage of the second kind condition introduced by
M. R asonyi [16]. We show that this condition implies the closedness of the set
of attainable claims and is equivalent to the existence of a strictly consistent
price system under which the evaluation of future production prots is strictly
negative. This allows us to discuss the closedness of the set of terminal wealth in
models with non-linear production, functions which may admit arbitrages of the
second kind for low production regimes but not marginally for high production
regimes.
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This paper is motivated by applications in optimal hedging of electricity derivatives for
electricity producers. Electricity producers sell derivative contracts that allow them
to buy electricity at dierent periods and at a price xed in advance. In practice,
the producer can deliver the required quantities of electricity either by producing it
or by buying it on the spot market. He can also try to cover himself through future
contracts, but the granularity of the available maturities on the market is in general
insucient.
It is a typical situation where a nancial agent can manage a portfolio by either trading
on a nancial market or by producing a good himself. Such models have already
been studied in the literature, in particular by Bouchard and Pham [1] who discussed
the questions of no-arbitrage, super-hedging and expected utility maximization in a
discrete time model with proportional transaction costs, see also Kabanov and Kijima
[7] and the references therein.
In [1], the assets are divided in two classes. The rst class corresponds to purely
nancial assets, e.g. bonds, stocks, options, etc. The second class corresponds to
industrial assets, e.g. plants or buildings. Industrial assets cannot be short-sold,
contrary to nancial assets. Moreover, they produce a (random) return at each period.
These are expressed in terms of nancial assets, and depend on the current inventory
in industrial assets.
This model is well-adapted to industrial investment problems but not to production
issues, since the production regime does not appear as a control.
In this paper, we consider another approach. As in [1], we work in a discrete time
model with proportional transaction costs. Although it does not need to be explicit
in the model, we have in mind that the assets are divided in two classes: the nancial
assets and industrial ones. Both can be traded in the market but some of them can
be consumed in order to produce other assets. For instance, coal can be traded on the
market, but can also be used to produce electricity in order to produce cash, once sold.
The quantity used for production on the time period [t;t + 1] is chosen at time t. It
leaves the portfolio and enters a production process. Depending on the quantity used,
a (random) return enters the portfolio at time t + 1. Therefore, the main dierence
with [1] is that we explicitly decide on the production level at each time step, rather






































1Obviously, both approaches can be combined. We refrain from doing this in this
paper in order to isolate the eect of our production model and to avoid unnecessary
complexity.
As in [1], we rst discuss the absence of arbitrage opportunity and its dual charac-
terization. In [1], the authors adapt the notion of robust no-arbitrage introduced by
Schachermayer [17]. It essentially means that there is still no-arbitrage even if transac-
tion costs are slightly reduced and production returns are slightly increased. It should
be noted that the arguments used in [1] could be easily adapted to our context. How-
ever, we prefer to adopt the (more natural) notion of no-arbitrage of the second kind,
which was recently introduced in the context of nancial markets with transactions
costs by R asonyi [16] under the name of no-sure gain in liquidation value, see also
[4] for a continuous time version. The latter notion implies that we cannot turn an
insolvent position at time t into a position which is a.s. solvent at a later time T, by
trading on the market. In models without transaction costs, this corresponds to the
usual notion of no-arbitrage.
Another dierence with Bouchard and Pham [1] is that we allow for reasonable ar-
bitrages due to the production possibilities. Here, reasonable means that it may be
possible to have a.s. positive net returns for low production regimes. However, they
should be limited in the sense that marginal arbitrages for high production regimes
are not possible.
The way we model this consists in assuming that the production function  ! R()
admits an ane upper bound  ! c + L, which is somehow sharp for large values
of , and that the linear model in which R is replaced by L admits no arbitrage of
the second kind. In the case where each component of R is concave, the following
may hold for L and R: lim!1 R()= = L (whenever it makes sense), i.e., no-
arbitrage holds in a marginal way for large regimes . From the economic point of
view, this means that gains can be made from production in reasonable situations,
but that producing more becomes (marginally) risky when the regime of production
is pushed too high.
From a mathematical point of view, it allows us to reduce the model to a linear one,
at rst, for which a nice dual formulation of the no-arbitrage condition is available.
Indeed the set of dual variables can be fully described in terms of martingales evolving
in appropriate sets. This is not the case for non-linear models (see [1]). The dual






































1to prove that the set of attainable claims is closed. One can then show that the set
of attainable claims is indeed closed in probability both in the linear and the original
models. As usual, this leads to a dual formulation of these sets. It can also be used
to prove existence for expected utility maximization problems, which, in particular,
allow the study of indierence prices.
Importantly, it should be noted that our approach is dierent from the notions of no
marginal and no scalable arbitrage studied in [13] in the context of market models
with convex trading cost functions, see also [14] and the references therein. We will
discuss this in more detail in Remark 2.4 below.
We refer to [11] for a wide overview of models with proportional transaction costs. See
also [14] and [15] for some more recent results in discrete time, and [5] or [6] for the
continuous time setting.
The paper is organized as follows. We rst describe our model, state the dual character-
ization of our no-arbitrage condition and important closedness properties in Section 2.
Section 3 discusses applications to super-hedging and utility maximization problems.
The proofs are collected in Section 4.
Notations: Unless otherwise specied, any element x 2 Rd will be viewed as a column
vector with entries xi, i  d, and transposition is denoted by x0 so that x0y stands for
the scalar product. We write Md to denote the set of square matrices M of dimension
d with entries Mij, i;j  d. The identity matrix is denoted by Id. As usual, Rd
+ and
Rd
  stand for [0;1)d and ( 1;0]d. The closure of a set   Rn is denoted by  ,
n  1. We write cone() (resp. conv()) to denote the cone (resp. convex cone)
generated by . Given a ltration F on a probability space (
;F;P) and a set-valued
F-measurable family A = (At)tT, we denote by L0(A;F) the set of adapted processes
X = (Xt)tT such that Xt 2 At P   a.s. for all t  T. For a -algebra G and a G-
measurable random set A, we write L0(A;G) for the collection of G-measurable random
variables that take values in A P   a.s. We similarly dene the notations Lp(A;G) for
p 2 N [ 1, and simply write Lp if A and G are clearly given by the context. Unless
otherwise specied, inequalities between random variables or inclusion between random






































12 Denitions and main results
2.1 Model description
From now on we denote by T 2 Nnf0g a xed time horizon and set T := f0;1;:::;Tg.
The complete ltration of the investor, F = (Ft)t2T, is supported by a probability
space (
;F;P). We assume that FT = F and that F0 is trivial.
As in [17], we model exchange prices by an adapted process  = (t)t2T taking values
in the set Md of square d-dimensional matrices, for some d  1, satisfying the following
conditions for all t  T and i;j;k  d:
(i) 
ij
t > 0; (ii) 
ii









t should be interpreted as the number of units of asset i required to obtain
one unit of asset j at time t. The conditions (i) and (ii) need no comment. The third
condition is also natural. It means that it is always cheaper to buy directly units of
asset k from units of asset i rather then going through the asset j. Note that, combined




t  1, which means that the ask price is always greater




t = 1 corresponds to the situation where the
ask and bid prices are the same, i.e. there is no friction.
All over this paper, we shall consider the so-called ecient friction case:




t > 1 for all i 6= j  d and t 2 T.
It means that ask prices are always strictly greater than bid prices.
As in [8] and [9], we model portfolios as d-dimensional processes, each component i
corresponding to the number of units of asset i detained. The composition Vt of a
portfolio holding at time t can be changed by acting on the nancial market. If t
denotes the net number of additional units of each asset in the portfolio after trading
at time t, it should satisfy the standard self-nancing condition. In our context, this
means that t 2  Kt, since we allow to discard any non-negative number of holdings,






t (!)ei   ej;ei ; i;j  d

; (2.2)
where ei stands for the i-th unit vector of Rd dened by ek
i = 1i=k.
Note that Vt 2 Kt means that there exists t 2  Kt such that Vt + t = 0. This






































1that can be turned into positions with non-negative entries by immediately trading on
the market.
As in Bouchard and Pham [1], we also allow for production. In [1], the production
regime depends only on the inventories in some production assets. Here, we consider
a dierent approach based on a full control of the production regimes. Namely, we
consider a family of random maps (Rt)t2T from Rd
+ into Rd that corresponds to pro-
duction functions. It turns t units of assets taken from the portfolio at time t into
Rt+1(t) additional units of assets in the portfolio at time t + 1. For the moment, we
only assume that Rt+1 is Ft+1 measurable, in the sense that Rt+1() 2 L0(Rd;Ft+1) for
all  2 L0(Rd
+;Ft). The control t can be associated to a regime of production. Com-
ponentwise, the greater t gets, the more the producer is putting into the production
system.
All together, a strategy is a pair of adapted processes




i.e., such that (t;t) 2 L0(( Kt)  Rd
+;Ft) for all 0  t  T. The corresponding








(s   s + Rs(s 1)1s1) : (2.3)
Example 2.1 Let us consider a market model where the agent produces electricity that
can then be sold on the spot market. For ease of presentation, we only consider the case
where the production takes place in a single monetary zone, say Euro, but the model
can be extended to several currencies. The market consists of three assets: the rst one
is cash, the second one is coal and the last one is fuel. Allowed self-nanced strategies
 are described by the bid-ask process (ij)1i;j3. The agent can use coal or fuel for
production purpose, but can also buy a one period ahead delivery contract to small local
electricity producers. Given a regime t, the producer obtains a return r1
t+1(t) labeled
in cash at time t+1, depending on the electricity spot price. Since he does not produce
coal or fuel, there is no return in these two assets. As a consequence, the production
function Rt+1 has the form (r1
t+1;0;0), and is a random Ft+1-measurable function.
Remark 2.1 Observe that we do not impose constraints on portfolio processes. In
particular, one can consume some assets for production purposes although one does not






































1system. As usual, additional convex constraints could be introduced without much
diculty.







s   s + Rs(s 1)1st+1 ; (;) 2 A0
)
; t  T ; (2.4)
the set of portfolio holdings that are attainable at time T by trading from time t with
a zero initial holding.
Remark 2.2 The sequence of random cones K = (Kt)t2T is dened here through the
bid-ask process . However, it should be clear that all our analysis remains true in a
more abstract framework. Namely, one could only consider that K is a sequence of
closed convex cones such that Kt is Ft-measurable, Rd
+  Kt and Kt \ ( Kt) = f0g
for all t  T.
2.2 The no-arbitrage condition
In a model without production, i.e., R  0, R asonyi [16] recently proposed to consider
the following no-arbitrage of the second kind condition, also called no-sure gain in
liquidation value, NGV in short:
NA20: ( + A0
t(T)) \ L0(KT;F) 6= f0g )  2 L0(Kt;F), for all  2 L0(Rd;Ft) and
t  T:
This means that we cannot end-up at time T with a solvent position without taking
any risk if the initial position is not already solvent.
In this paper, we shall impose a similar condition on the pure nancial part of the
model, i.e., there is no-arbitrage of the second kind for strategies of the form (;0) 2 A0.
Contrary to [1], we do not exclude arbitrages coming from production whenever the
production regime is small. We only exclude marginal arbitrages for high regimes of
production in the following sense:
Denition 2.1 1. Given L 2 L0(Md;F), we say that there is no arbitrage of the
second kind for the linear production map L, in short NA2L holds, if
(i)     + Lt+1 2 L0(Kt+1;Ft+1) )  2 Kt,






































1for all (;) 2 L0(Rd  Rd
+;Ft) and t < T.
2. We say that there is no marginal arbitrage of the second kind for high production
regimes, in short NMA2 holds, if there exists (c;L) 2 L0(Rd;F)L0(Md;F) such that
NA2L holds and
ct+1 + Lt+1   Rt+1() 2 L
0(Kt+1;Ft+1) for all  2 L0(Rd
+;Ft) and t < T. (2.5)
The condition (2.5) means that the production function Rt admits an ane upper
bound. In most production models, each component Ri
t, i  d, is concave, so that
Rt typically admits such a bound. In (i) and (ii), we focus on the production model
where R is replaced with the linear map associated to L. The fact that we consider
the production map  7! Lt+1 instead of  7! ct+1 + Lt+1 coincides with the idea
that we only want to avoid arbitrages for high production regimes: for large values of
jLt+1j, jct+1j becomes negligible.
For L  0, the condition (i) is equivalent to the NGV condition of [16], this follows
from a simple induction under the standing assumption (EF) above. Our version is a
simple extension to the production-investment model. Condition (i) means that, even
if we produce, we cannot almost surely have a solvent position at time t + 1 if the
position was not already solvent at time t. Condition (ii) means that producing may
lead to net losses.
In the following, unless otherwise specied, we shall consider (c;L) as given once for
all, and such that (2.5) is satised (whenever NMA2 holds). We shall refer to the
linear model as the one where R is replaced by  7! L.
Remark 2.3 If esssupfjRt+1()j; 2 L0(Rd
+;F)g 2 L1 for all t < T, then one can
choose L  0. In this case, NMA2 coincides with the NGV condition of [16] on the
pure nancial part, i.e., the no-arbitrage condition is set only on strategies of the form
(;0).
Let us now illustrate the no-arbitrage condition NMA2 in the context of the model
described in Example 2.1.
Example 2.2 Consider the electricity production model of Example 2.1. If r1
t is P  
a.s. concave and non-decreasing, then r1
t()= admits P   a.s. a limit L1
t() as  !
1, where the map  7! L1
t() is P a.s. linear. It follows that Rt()= admits a limit
as  ! 1 with can be associated to a random matrix Lt of dimension 3. Moreover,






































1We consider now a specic model of such a situation. Recall that 2
t (resp. 3
t) denotes
the number of units of coal (resp. fuel) sent to power plants using coal (resp. fuel) at
time t. Hereafter coal and fuel are called technologies 2 and 3. The agent has ni  1
power plants that use the technology i = 2;3. The k-th power plant that uses the
technology i has a maximal capacity ik
t+1 2 L0(R+ [ f1g;Ft+1) for the time period
[t;t + 1], i = 2;3 and k = 1;:::;ni. The case ik
t+1 = 1 means that there is no limit
on the number of quantities that can be treated. Each of them convert one unit of
raw material sent to the plant at time t into lik
t+1 2 L0(R+;Ft+1) MWh of energy that
are sold on the spot market at a price st+1 2 L0(R;Ft+1). The factor lik
t+1 is called
the heat rate of the k-th power plant, which uses the technology i. The randomness
of ik
t+1 and lik
t+1 allows one to model possible random outages or temperature eects
in the production process, for instance. For ease of presentation, we assume that the
producer has an idea which power plant is more ecient and uses that one in priority.






t+1 P   a.s. for all k 2 [1;ni   1], i = 2;3 and t < T. (2.6)




























t+1 denotes the maximal capacity of the best k   1 plants,
y+ denotes the positive part of a real number y, and ik
t+1 2 L0(R+;Ft+1) stands for a
(possibly random) xed cost associated to the k-th power plant (e.g., a starting cost).
We denote by 1
t the amount of cash used at time t to buy one period ahead delivery
contracts from small local electricity producers. The price of these contracts at time t
is ft 2 L0((0;1);Ft) per MWh. Thus, consuming 1











units of cash at time t+1, once all MWh have been sold on the spot market at the spot
price st+1.





















































t+1 is not concave, except if ik = 0 for all i;k, and st+1  0, which may










t+1 for i = 2;3, and L
ji




t := minfk  ni : 
ik
t+1 = 1g ;
with the usual convention min; = 1. The above choice of L is the smallest possible
one (component-by-component) under (2.6). As for the minimal possible c (component-



















which is P   a.s. nite.
We conclude this section with a remark that highlights the dierences between the
notion of no marginal arbitrage for high production regimes introduced here and the
(seemingly close) notions of no marginal arbitrage and no scalable arbitrage discussed
in [13].
Remark 2.4 1. In [13] and the references therein, the author discusses the notion
of no marginal arbitrage in the context of discrete time models with stock prices
depending in a convex way on the quantity to buy/sell. In the terminology of this
paper, a marginal arbitrage has to be understood as an arbitrage obtained when trading
the marginal price process associated to innitesimal trades. In our context, where
the non-linearity only comes from the production map R, this would (essentially)
correspond to an arbitrage obtained for innitesimal values of , i.e. marginally around
 = 0. Here, we also consider arbitrages that can happen marginally, but, as explained
above, as a \surplus" around large regimes/values of  and not around 0. This explains
why we use the terminology of marginal arbitrage for high production regimes. Clearly,
the two notions are very dierent.
2. In [13], the author also discusses the notion of no scalable arbitrage. It expresses
the fact that an arbitrage cannot be arbitrarily scaled by a positive scalar. In our














































1For real valued concave maps R satisfying R(0) = 0, the no scalable arbitrage condition
(essentially) means that the usual no-arbitrage condition holds when considering the
production map  7! rR(1), whenever we can give a sense to the gradient rR and
it admits a limit at innity. In this case, with L := rR(1) in NMA2 , we see that (at
least formally) our no marginal arbitrage of second kind condition for high production
regimes, could be viewed as a no scalable arbitrage of second kind condition.
This is not the case in general. Apart from technicalities (for instance, we do not
assume necessarily concavity, except for the super-hedging theorems of Section 3.1), the
main reason is that we are not interested in arbitrages that are scalable but arbitrages
that can appear marginally as a \surplus" given that the production regime is already
high. To illustrate this, let us consider a very simple (degenerate) two dimensional
model with two periods t = 0;1: We take 12
t = 2 and 21
t = 1 for t = 0;1; R1
1() =
  c +  L11 and R2 = 0 where  c > 0 is a constant and P
 L1 = 1

= 0. This model
satises (2.5) with c1 = (  c;0), L11
1 =  L1, L
ij
1 = 0 for (i;j) 6= (1;1). In this model,
direct computations show that a claim of the form g = (g( L1   1);0), with g > 0,
is scalable, i.e., belongs to \>0AR
0 (T), if and only if, for each  > 0, one can nd
1
0 2 R+ and  2 L0(R+;F1) such that 1
0 = g= + ( c + )=( L1   1). Because
 c > 0 and  has to take non-negative values, this is not possible, except in the case
where  L1 is not random (otherwise 
1;
0 would be a random variable as opposed to a
real number). This shows that such claims are not scalable (in general) in the sense
that they do not belong to \>0AR
0 (T). Hence, in general, the no scalable arbitrage
condition does not say anything on such claims, while our NMA2 condition says
exactly that they cannot belong to L0(R2
+;F1) n f0g.
2.3 Dual characterization of the no-arbitrage condition and
closedness properties
Before we state our main results, let us introduce some additional notations and de-
nitions.
We rst dene the positive dual cone process K = (K







0z  0 for all x 2 Kt(!)
	
; ! 2 
 :
For t    T, we denote by M
t(intK) the set of martingales Z with positive
components satisfying Zs 2 L0(intK
s;Fs) for all t  s  .
Elements of MT
t (intK) are called strictly consistent price systems, on [t;T], in [17].






































1could be interpreted in a way such that the relative prices evolve in the interior of
the corresponding bid-ask intervals of the original model induced by , i.e. are more











t (!) for all i 6= j  d
	
: (2.8)
Taking the rst asset as a num eraire, i.e., for  Z dened as  Zi
s := Zi
s=Z1
s for t  s 
T and for any Z 2 MT
t (intK), it follows that  Z is a martingale on [t;T] under
the measure Q induced by the conditional density process (Z1
s=Z1




s for t  s  T.
Remark 2.5 Note that the condition (EF) above is actually equivalent to intK
t 6= ;
for all t  T. This follows from (2.8).
All together, elements of MT
0(intK) play a similar role as equivalent martingale mea-
sures in frictionless markets, see [17] and the references therein. In particular, it was
shown in [16] that, for L  0, the no-arbitrage condition NA20 is equivalent to:
PCE0: for each 0  t  T and X 2 L1(intK
t ;Ft), there exists a process Z 2
MT
t (intK) satisfying Zt = X.
This not only means that the no-arbitrage condition NA20 implies the existence of
a strictly consistent price system, but that strictly consistent price systems dened
on any subinterval [t;] can also be extended consistently on [t;T]. Indeed for Z 2
M
t(intK), one can nd a strictly consistent price system ~ Z 2 MT
t (intK) such that
~ Z = Z on [t;].
Such a property is obvious in frictionless markets but in general not true in our mul-
tivariate setting where the geometry of the cones (K
t )t2T is non-trivial.
In our production-investment setting, such price systems should also take the produc-
tion function into account. When it is linear and given by the random matrix process
L, the cost in units at time t of a return (in units) Lt+1 at time t+1 is  2 L0(Rd
+;Ft).
Otherwise stated, one can build the position (Lt+1   Id) at time t + 1 from a zero
holding at time t. For the price system  Z and the associated pricing measure Q, see
the discussion above, the value at time t of this return is EQ[  Z0
t+1(Lt+1  Id) j Ft]. If
the ctitious price system is strictly more favorable than the original one, one should
actually be able to choose it in such a way that EQ[  Z0








































1The above discussion leads to the introduction of the set L
t(intRd
 ) of martingales Z
on [t;] with positive components satisfying E

jZ0
s+1(Ls+1   Id)j j Fs





s+1(Ls+1   Id) j Fs

2 intRd
  for all t  s < , t<  T P   a.s.
Our rst main result extends the property NA20 , PCE0 to NA2L , PCEL where
PCEL: for each 0  t  T and X 2 L1(intK
t ;Ft), there exists a process Z 2
MT
t (intK) \ LT
t (intRd
 ) satisfying Zt = X.
Theorem 2.1 NA2L , PCE
L.
Remark 2.6 Note that the property PCEL allows one to construct (in theory) all
the elements of MT
0(intK)\LT
0(intRd
 ) by a simple forward induction. First, one can
start with any Z0 2 intK




been constructed, one can then choose any random variable Zt+1 2 L0(intK
t+1;Ft+1)
such that E[Zt+1 j Ft] = Zt and E

Z0




to simple linear inequalities. When 
 is nite, the set of such random variables can
be described explicitly.




 ) then allows one to provide a L1 upper bound on strategies (;) 2 A0 sat-
isfying V
;
T + 2 KT for some  2 Rd. However, because no integrability condition is
imposed a-priori on c, we require the additional assumption:













< 1 8 0 < t  T : (2.9)
Lemma 2.1 Assume that (2.9) holds. Then, there exists Q  P and a constant   0,
such that, for all  2 Rd and (;) 2 A0 satisfying V
;

























cs ; t < T : (2.10)












































1In view of Theorem 2.1, applying Lemma 2.1 to the case R() = 0 + L, i.e. c = 0,
leads to the following corollary: Assume that NA2L holds. Then, there exists Q  P,
Z0 2 intK
0 and a constant   0 such that, for all  2 Rd and (;) 2 A0 satisfying
V
;


















(s   s + Ls(s 1)1st+1); (;) 2 A0
)
;
are Fatou-closed, in the sense that the limit in probability of sequences of elements
(gn)n1  AL
t (T) satisfying gn + 2 KT for all n  1 belongs to AL
t (T) as well. Under
(2.9), a similar result could be easily proved by appealing to Lemma 2.1 for the sets
AR





0) 2  Kt for all 
0 2 R
d
+ ; t  T
where the limsup is taken component-by-component. Such Fatou-closedness properties
are sucient for applications, but they require (2.9). In order to deal with the general
case, i.e., when (2.9) may not hold, we need to use more elaborate arguments, which
actually allows one to obtain the following stronger closedness property.
Theorem 2.2 AL
0(T) is closed in probability under NA2L. The same holds for AR
0 (T)
under NMA2 and (USC).
Example 2.3 We continue the study of Example 2.2. Hereafter, we assume that
conditions (2.1) and (EF) are satised. Note that the condition (ii) of NA2L is













t  0 ) t = 0
which is equivalent to










> 0 for i = 2;3:
Assuming that the above condition is satised, then (i) of NA2L is equivalent to the ex-
istence of an element Z 2 MT
0(intK)\LT
0(intRd







































T and  Z := Z=Z1. As in [8], [17] and [16], the fact that Z 2 MT
0(intK) is equivalent
to  Zi=  Zj < ji for all i 6= j, and each  Zi is a Q-martingale, i = 2;3. The new condition
Z 2 LT
0(intRd










t+1 j Ft]    Zi
t < 0 for i = 2;3.
Note that (USC) trivially holds in this example, so that Theorem 2.2 implies that
AR
0 (T) is closed in probability whenever the above conditions are satised.
3 Applications
3.1 Super-hedging theorems
As usual, the closedness property allows one to derive dual formulations for the set
of attainable claims. We rst formulate it in the linear model. In this section, we
denote by MT
0(K) the set of martingales Z satisfying Zs 2 L0(K
s;Fs) for all s  T,
and by LT
0(Rd




s+1(Ls+1   Id)j j Fs

< 1 and E

Z0
s+1(Ls+1   Id) j Fs

2 Rd
  for all s < T.
Proposition 3.1 Assume that NA2L holds and let V 2 L0(Rd;F) be such that V +
 2 L0(KT;F) for some  2 Rd. Then the following assertions are equivalent:
(i) V 2 AL
0(T),
(ii) E[Z0









In the original non-linear model, an abstract dual formulation is also available. How-
ever, due to the non-linearity of the set of attainable terminal claims, it requires the





















0 (T) s:t: V +  2 KT for some  2 R
d	
:
Remark 3.1 1. It will be clear from the proof in Section 4.2, see (4.6) with " = 0,






for all Z 2 MT
0(K) \ LT
0(Rd
 ), whenever the last term is
well dened, which is in particular the case if ct is essentially bounded from below,
component-by-component, for each t  T.
2. Let L be dened as R in the case R() = 0+L. Since 0 2 AL
0(T), we have L  0.
On the other hand, 1. applied to R() = 0 + L, i.e. c = 0, implies that L(Z)  0
for all Z 2 MT
0(K) \ LT
0(Rd









































1Moreover, as usual, we shall need the set AR
0 (T) to be convex, which is easily checked
under the additional assumption (R)(a) below. We will also require that bounded
strategies lead to L1-bounded from below terminal wealth values. We therefore impose
the following conditions:
(R) : (a) Rt(1) + (1   )Rt(2)   Rt(1 + (1   )2) 2  Kt




+;F) ; t  T:
(b) R
 
t () 2 L
1(R




where we have used the notation R  := (maxf Ri;0g)id.
Remark 3.2 The technical condition (R)(b) is by no means restrictive. One can




t ()j= (); t  T;  2 Rd
+g =:  2 L0(R+;F). Indeed, in this
case, it suces to replace the original probability measure P by ~ P  P dened by
d~ P=dP = e =E[e ]. Since ~ P  P , this does not aect the conditions NA2L, (USC)
and (R)(a).
Proposition 3.2 Assume that NMA2 , (USC) and (R) hold. Fix V 2 L0(Rd;F)
such that V + 2 L0(KT;F), for some  2 Rd, and consider the following assertions:
(i) V 2 AR
0 (T),
(ii) E[Z0
TV ]  R(Z) for all Z 2 MT
0(K),
(iii) E[Z0
TV ]  R(Z) for all Z 2 MT
0(intK).
Then, (i), (ii)) (iii). If moreover there exists some Z 2 MT
0(intK) such that
R(Z) < 1, then (iii))(ii).
In the case where the linear map L coincides with the asymptotic behavior of R, i.e.,
(RL) : lim
!1Rt()= = Lt for all  2 R
d
+ ; t  T ;




 )) in the above dual formula-
tions.
Proposition 3.3 Let the conditions of Proposition 3.2 hold. Assume further that
(RL) is satised. Fix V 2 L0(Rd;F) such that V +  2 L0(KT;F), for some  2 Rd,
and consider the following assertions:
(i) V 2 AR
0 (T),
(ii) E[Z0


















































such that R(Z) < 1, then (iii))(ii).
Remark 3.3 It follows from Remark 3.1 that (i), (ii), (iii) in Propositions 3.2
and 3.3 whenever assumption (2.9) holds. It is the case under NMA2 whenever c is
essentially bounded.
3.2 Utility maximization
In order to avoid technical diculties, we shall only discuss here the case of a (possibly)
random utility function dened on Rd that is essentially bounded from above. More
general cases could be discussed by following the line of arguments of [1].
We therefore let U be a P a.s.-upper semi-continuous concave random map from Rd
to [ 1;1] such that U(V ) =  1 on fV = 2 KTg for V 2 L0(Rd;F). Given an initial





0 (T) : E[jU(x0 + V )j] < 1
	
6= ;:
Then, existence holds for the associated expected utility maximization problem when-
ever (USC), (R) and NMA2 hold, and there exists Z 2 MT
0(intK) such that
R(Z) < 1. The latter being a consequence of NMA2 when c is essentially bounded
(recall Remark 3.1 and Theorem 2.1).
Proposition 3.4 Assume that (USC), (R) and NMA2 hold, and that R(Z) < 1
for some Z 2 MT
0(intK). Assume further that U(x0) 6= ;. Then, there exists
V (x0) 2 AR
0 (T) such that
E[U(x0 + V (x0))] = sup
V 2U(x0)
E[U(x0 + V )] :
4 Proofs
4.1 No-arbitrage of the second kind in the linear model and
(K;L)-strictly consistent price systems
In this section, we rst prove that the no-arbitrage of the second kind assumption
NA2L implies the existence of an element Z 2 MT
0(intK) \ LT
0(intRd
 ) that we call






































1The arguments used in the proof of Proposition 4.1 below are inspired by [16], up to
non-trivial modications. This proposition readily implies that NA2L ) PCE
L up
to an obvious induction argument. Before we state it, we recall the following technical
result that will be used in our proof, see Lemma 4.3 in [15]. In the following, B1
denotes the unit ball of Rd.
Lemma 4.1 Let G  H  F be -algebras. Let C  B1 be a H-measurable random
convex compact set. Then, there exists a G-measurable random convex compact set
E[CjG]  B1 satisfying
L
0(E[CjG];G) = fE[#jG] : # 2 L
0(C;H)g:
Proposition 4.1 Assume that NA2L holds. Then, for all t < T and X 2 L1(intK
t ;Ft),
there exists Z 2 L1(intK
t+1;Ft+1) such that X = E[Z j Ft], E[jZ0(Lt+1   Id)j j Ft] <
1 and E[Z0(Lt+1   Id) j Ft] 2 intRd
 .






t+1j and  Mt+1 := t+1Mt+1. Clearly,  Mt+1 is essentially bounded.
1. We rst show that intRd




t+1y + r; (y;r) 2 (K

t+1 \ B1)  [0;1]
d	
;
recall that B1 is the unit ball of Rd. For later use, observe that, since  Mt+1 is essentially
bounded, Lemma 4.1 applies to  up to an obvious scaling argument.
If intRd
  6 H, then Rd
  6  H on a set A 2 Ft with P[A] > 0. For each ! 2 A,  H(!)
being a closed convex cone, we can then nd p(!) 2 Rd
  and (!) 2 Rd such that
p(!)
0(!) < 0  q
0(!) for all q 2  H(!) for ! 2 A : (4.1)
By a standard measurable selection argument, see e.g. [3, III-45], one can assume that
p and  are Ft-measurable. The right-hand side of (4.1), Lemma 4.1 and the fact that
K
t+1 is a cone then imply that
(Y
0  Mt+1 + 






which leads to 1A 2 Rd
+ and  Mt+11A 2 Kt+1. Since Kt+1 is a cone, the latter implies
Mt+11A 2 Kt+1. In view of NA2L, this implies that 1A = 0, which contradicts the
left-hand side of (4.1).
2. We next show that there exists ~ Y 2 L1(intK
t+1;Ft+1) such that E
h
 M0










































1To see this, x  2 L1(intRd
 ;Ft) and Z 2 L1(intK





We can then nd " 2 L1((0;1];Ft) such that  "  Z 2 L1(intRd
 ;Ft). In view of step
1 and Lemma 4.1, there exists (Y;) 2 L1(K
t+1Rd
+;Ft+1) and  2 L0(intR+;Ft) such
that  "  Z = E
  M0
t+1Y +  j Ft

or, equivalently,  E[ j Ft] = E
  M0
t+1(Y + "Z) j Ft

.
Clearly,  E[ j Ft] 2 intRd
  and Y +"Z 2 L0(intK
t+1;Ft+1). The required result
is thus obtained for ~ Y := (Y + "Z)=(1 + ).
3. We now show that int(K
t  Rd





t+1y + r); (y;r) 2 (K

t+1 \ B1)  [0;1]
d	
:
If the above does not hold , then K
t  Rd
+ 6  E on a set A 2 Ft, with P[A] > 0, and
the same arguments as in step 1 imply that we can nd (p;q) 2 L0(K
t  Rd
+;Ft) and
(;) 2 L0(Rd  Rd;Ft) such that
p
0+q
0 < 0 on A and 0  Y
0(t+1+  Mt+1)+






The right-hand side implies that  2 Rd
+ and t+1+  Mt+1 = t+1 ( + Mt+1) 2 Kt+1,
and therefore  + Mt+1 2 Kt+1. In view of NA2L, this implies that  2 Kt. On the
other hand, the fact that (q;) 2 Rd
+Rd
+ combined with the left-hand side inequality
above implies that p0 < 0. This leads to a contradiction since p 2 K
t and  2 Kt.
4. We can now conclude the proof. Fix X 2 L1(intK
t ;Ft), let ~ Y be as in step
2 and x " 2 L1((0;1];Ft) such that ~ X := X   "E
h




It then follows from step 3 and Lemma 4.1 that, for any  2 L0(intRd
+;Ft), we
can nd Y 2 L1(K
t+1;Ft+1) and  2 L0(R+;Ft) such that ~ X = E[t+1Y j Ft]










t+1~ Y j Ft
i
2 intRd







  where Z := t+1(Y + "~ Y ) 2 intK
t+1. Since X 2 L1 and K  Rd
+, we must
have Z 2 L1. Moreover, ~ Y ;Y and t+1Mt+1 =  Mt+1 are essentially bounded, while





< 1 P   a.s. This shows the
required result. 2
It remains to prove the opposite implication of Theorem 2.1.
Proposition 4.2 PCEL ) NA2L.
Proof We x t < T.
1. We rst assume that we can nd (;) 2 L0(Rd  Rd
+;Ft) satisfying






































1and such that  = 2 Kt on a set A 2 Ft of positive measure. Without loss of generality,
we can assume that (;) 2 L1(Rd  Rd
+;Ft), since the same statements hold for
(1 + jj + jj) 1(;). This implies that we can nd Zt 2 L1(intK
t ;Ft) such that
Z
0
t < 0 on A : (4.3)
In view of PCEL, we can then nd Zt+1 2 L1(intK




t+1(Lt+1   Id)j j Ft







 . By (4.2), we have
Z0
t+1 + Z0













  and  2 Rd
+,
this leads to a contradiction to (4.3).
2. We now assume that  2 L0(Rd
+;Ft) is such that (Lt+1   Id) 2 Kt+1. For Zt+1
dened as above, we obtain Z0







This implies that  = 0. 2
4.2 The closedness properties
In this section, we prove that the set AL
0(T) is closed in probability whenever there
exists a (K;L)-strictly consistent price system, i.e., MT
0(intK)\LT
0(intRd
 ) 6= ;, and
that the same holds for AR
0 (T) under the additional assumption (USC). In view of
Theorem 2.1, Theorem 2.2 is a direct consequence of Corollary 4.1 below. We start
with the proof of the key Lemma 2.1 which will be later applied to the linear case
R() = 0 + L.
Proof of Lemma 2.1. Fix  Z such that (2.9) holds. In this proof, we set Mt+1 :=




, for t < T, in order to clear notations. We rst





t   "jj and  Z
0
t   "jj for all (;) 2 L
0(( Kt)  R
d
+;Ft) ; t  T ; (4.4)
for some " 2 L0((0;1);F), compare this also with Lemma 3.1 in [2].
We next deduce from (2.3)-(2.5) that
V
;
T = XT where Xt :=
X
st
s + s + (cs + Mss 1)1s1 for some  2 L0( K;F). (4.5)
Since XT +  = V
;
T +  2 KT, we have  Z0














































































(jtj + jtj + jt 1j1t1)
#
; (4.6)
which implies the required result for Q  P dened by dQ=dP := " with  := 1=E["].
2
We can now prove the closedness properties.





is closed in probability. If moreover (USC) is satised, then the same holds for AR
0 (T).
Proof We use an induction argument which combines the techniques rst introduced
in [10] and Lemma 2.1 applied to the linear case R() = 0 + L.
1. We rst check that AR
T(T) is closed in probability, recall (2.4). Indeed, let (gn)n1 
AR




+;FT) be such that n
T n
T = gn for all n  1 and set E := fliminfn!1 jn
Tj <
1g. We claim that E = 







T = 1Ecgn=(1 + jn
Tj) +  n
T. In view of Lemma 4.2 below, we can assume, after
possibly passing to an FT-measurable subsequence, that 1Ecgn=(1 + jn
Tj) +  n
T !
 T 2 L0(Rd
+;FT) P   a.s. as n ! 1, with j Tj = 1 on Ec. On the other hand
 n
T1Ec 2  KT1Ec P a.s. Since  KT \Rd
+ = f0g, this leads to a contradiction. It fol-
lows that liminfn!1 jn
Tj < 1 P a.s. The closedness property of AR
T(T) then follows
from Lemma 4.2 again. The fact that AL
T(T) is closed in probability follows from the
same arguments.
2. We now x t < T, assume that AR
t+1(T) and AL
t+1(T) are closed in probability
and deduce that the same holds for AR
t (T). The corresponding result for AL
t (T) is
obviously obtained by considering the special case where R() = 0 + L.
Let (gn)n1  AR
t (T) and (n;n)n1  A0 be such that
V
n;n
T = gn for all n  1 : (4.7)
We assume that
gn ! g 2 L
0(R
d;F) P   a.s. as n ! 1 :
















































t has been dened in (2.10). Set n := 1 + jn
t j + jn
t j. We claim that




t + (Lt+1   Id) 
n









t ;  n
t ) := 1Ec(n
t ;n
t )=n 2 L0(( Kt)  Rd
+;Ft) and  V n := 1EcV n=n 2
AL
t+1(T). Moreover, Lemma 4.2 below implies that, after possibly passing to an Ft-
measurable subsequence, ( n
t ;  n
t ) ! ( t;  t) P   a.s. as n ! 1 for some ( t;  t) 2
L0(( Kt)Rd
+;Ft) such that ( t;  t) 6= 0 on Ec. Since AL













t !   t (Lt+1 Id) t 2 A
L
t+1(T) as n ! 1 :
We can then nd (;) 2 A0 such that
 t + (Lt+1   Id) t +
X
t+1sT
s + (Ls+11s+1T   Id)s = 0 :
We can now appeal to Lemma 2.1 applied to the case R() = 0 + L to deduce that
EQ 
j tj + j tj

 0 ; for some Q  P. Since ( t;  t) 6= 0 on Ec, this implies that
P[Ec] = 0, and therefore liminfn!1 n < 1 P   a.s. Using Lemma 4.2 below, one
can then assume, after possibly passing to an Ft-measurable random subsequence,
that (n
t ;n
t )n1 converges P   a.s. to some (t;t) 2 L0(( Kt)  Rd
+;Ft), for all
t  T. Using the semi-continuity assumption (USC) and d iterative applications of
Lemma 4.2, we can then nd an Ft+1-measurable subsequence ((n))n1 such that
Rt+1(
(n)
t ) ! Rt+1(t)+t+1 P a.s. as n ! 1 with t+1 2 L0( Kt+1;Ft+1). It then












! g   t+1   (t + Rt+1(t)   t) P   a.s.
We conclude by using the fact that the left-hand side term belongs to AR
t+1(T) which
is closed in probability by assumption. 2
We conclude this section with the statement we used in the above proof, see [12].
Lemma 4.2 Fix t  T and (n)n1  L0(Rd;Ft) be such that liminfn!1 jnj < 1.
Then, there exists a P   a.s.-increasing sequence ((n))n1  L0(N;Ft) converging







































We now turn to the proof of the super-hedging theorems, i.e., Propositions 3.1, 3.2
and 3.3. The result of Proposition 3.1 is a consequence of Proposition 3.3 and Remark
3.1. The fact that (i) ) (ii) ) (iii) in Propositions 3.2 and 3.3 is obvious. In the
following, we prove that (iii) ) (i) in Propositions 3.2 and 3.3 under the corresponding
additional assumptions. The fact that (ii) ) (i) is obtained by similar, actually shorter,
arguments which are fully contained in what follows.
Proof of (iii) ) (i) in Proposition 3.2: For ease of notations, we write M for L Id.
Fix V 2 L0(Rd;F) such that V + 2 KT for some  2 Rd, and assume that E[Z0
TV ] 
R(Z) for all Z 2 MT
0(intK), but that V = 2 AR
0b(T). Then, AR
0b(T) being closed in
probability by Theorem 2.2, it follows that, for k large enough (after possibly passing











TV ]  





0 (T) is closed in probability, AR
0 (T) \ L1(Rd;F) is closed in L1(Rd;F). The
latter being convex under (R)(a), we deduce from the Hahn-Banach theorem that we
can nd Y 2 L1(Rd;F) and r 2 R such that
E[Y





for all X 2 A
R




t := E[Y jFt]. Recalling that R(0)  2 L1 under (R)(b), we deduce that any
element of the form





t(0) ^ 1)id ;  2 L
1( Ks;Fs) for some s  T;
belongs to AR
0 (T) \ L1(Rd;F). This easily leads to ZY
s 2 K
s for s  T. Fix ~ Z 2
MT
0(intK), such that R( ~ Z) < 1, which is possible by assumption, and " 2 (0;1),







 (1   ")r + "





8 X 2 A
R
0 (T) \ L
1(R
d;F): (4.9)






TX]; X 2 A
R








which, combined with (4.9), would imply that R(  Z) < E
  Z0
TV k
. Thus leading to a







































1To see that the above claim holds, rst observe that, for X 2 AR
0 (T) such that
X+ 2 KT for some  2 Rd, one can always construct an essentially bounded sequence,
Xn := X1jXjn   1jXj>n for n  1, which converges P   a.s. to X. Using Fatou's
Lemma, one then obtains liminfn!1 E[Z0
TXn]  E[Z0
TX] for all Z 2 MT
0(K). More-
over, X +  2 KT implies X   Xn 2 KT so that Xn 2 AR
0 (T) for all n  1. This
proves (4.10). 2
Proof of (iii) ) (i) in Proposition 3.3: It suces to repeat the argument of the
above proof with ~ Z 2 LT
0(intRd
 ), which is possible by assumption, and to show that







  for all t  T. To see this,









 r for all X 2 A
R
0 (T) \ L
1(R
d;F) ;














 r for all  2 L
1(R
d
+;F) and n  1 :
Since ZY
T has non-negative components, as an element of K
T  Rd
+ P   a.s., the














In particular, (R)(b) and the above imply that ZY
T
0 P
1tT Rt(0) 2 L1 and that for



























Using the rst assertion in (R), we then deduce that, for   1 and s 2 L1(Rd
+;Fs),
Rs+1(s)   
 1Rs+1()   (1   
 1)Rs+1(0)
= Rs+1(
 1s + (1   
 1)0)   
 1Rs+1()   (1   






































1This shows that, for all s 2 L1(Rd















 (r   `)=n :











Since s 2 L1(Rd










Proof of Proposition 3.4. Let (V n)n1 be a maximizing sequence. Since U(V ) =
 1 on fV = 2 KTg, it must satisfy V n + x0 2 KT for all n  1. It then follows from
the denition of R and our assumptions that there exists Z 2 MT
0(intK) such that
E[Z0
T(V n + x0)]  R(Z) + Z0
0x0 < 1 for all n  1.
Since ZT 2 intK
T and V n +x0 2 KT, for all n  1, we can nd " 2 L0((0;1];FT) such
that
E["jV
n + x0j]  
R(Z) + Z
0
0x0 < 1 for all n  1 :
This is similar to Lemma 3.1 in [2]. By Komlos Lemma, one can then nd a sequence
(~ V n)n1 such that ~ V n 2 conv(V k; k  n) for all n  1, and (~ V n)n1 converges
P   a.s. to some V (x0) 2 L0(Rd;F). Since AR
0 (T) is convex under (R)(a), (~ V n)n1 
AR
0 (T). Since AR
0 (T) is closed in probability, see Theorem 2.2, we have V (x0) 2 AR
0 (T).
Moreover, the random map U being P   a.s. concave, (~ V n)n1 is also a maximizing
sequence. Since U(x0 + ~ V n)+  1 for each n  1, we nally deduce from Fatou's
Lemma and the P   a.s. upper semi-continuity of U that
sup
V 2U(x0)




U(x0 + ~ V
n)
i
 E[U(x0 + V (x0))] :
2
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